The Impact of Granting Market Economy Status to China on Antidumping Duties and Imports: The Case of Korea

Soonchan Park

doi:10.11644/KIEP.JEAI.2006.10.2.158

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East Asian Economic Review Vol. 10, No. 2, 2006. pp. 71-88.

DOI https://dx.doi.org/10.11644/KIEP.JEAI.2006.10.2.158

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The Impact of Granting Market Economy Status to China on Antidumping Duties and Imports: The Case of Korea

Author
Soonchan Park	Kongju National University spark@kongju.ac.kr

EAER is an open access journal distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license.

Abstract

The Korean government has officially recognized China as a full market economy. This paper investigates the impact of grantingThe Korean government has officially recognized China as a full market economy. This paper investigates the impact of granting market economy status to China on antidumping (AD) duties and imports. With regard to non-market economies (like China), it is presumed that prices and costs are influenced by state interference and, therefore, authorities use prices and costs from a third party economy to construct normal values. This, however, leads to higher dumping margins. This paper examines the use of Non-Market Economy (NME) on dumping margins and statistical analysis finds that NME, in fact, raises margins by 18.7∼27.3%. Furthermore, the imposition of AD duties significantly restrains trade; for example, a 10% AD duty causes imports to fall by about 1.5~3.4%.

JEL classification: F13

Keywords

Antidumping, Market Economy Status, Dumping Margin, Trade Effects

Language

Korean

References

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